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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ADA BRIDGE and JOSEPH L.
BRIDGE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
LeGRAND P. BACKMAN, MILTON V.
BACKMAN and HARLAN W.
CLARK, dlbl a Backman, Backman
& Clark,

Case No. 9197

Defendants and Respondents.

PETITION OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS
FOR RE-HEARING

TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH:
. Defendants and Respondents LeGrand P! Ba~ an,
•
YC~
\?.'1...(.
«~,/)~.-•
Milton V. Backman and Harlan W. Clark,
, re-:l
quest a re-hearing in the above entitled cause upon the
following grounds:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
I
The Court erred in finding and determining that appellants alleged a valid agreement by respondents to perfect
an appeal.

II
The Court erred in finding and determining that
respondents did not show as a matter of law that appellants
could not have recovered had an appeal been perfected.
Respectfully submitted,
ROMNEY & NELSON,
Attorneys for respondents.

I, George L. Nelson, of the firm of Romney & Nelson,
do hereby certify that the firm of Romney & Nelson are attorneys for respondents, petitioners in the above entitled
action, and that I am a member of said firm; that I have
carefully examined the decision herein and in my opinion
there is good reason to believe that the judgment is erroneous and should be re-examined.

Is/ GEORGE L. NELSON
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ARGUMENT
Point I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND DETERMINING THAT APPELLANTS ALLEGED A VALID
AGREEMENT WITH RESPONDENTS TO PERFECT AN
APPEAL.
The decision as rendered as to this point is against the
law of contracts.
Appellants do not allege an agreement but allege by
paragraph 2 of their amended complaint "on or about the
21st day of May, 1954, the plaintiffs herein, and defendant
in said contest action, went to the office of the defendants,
Backman, Backman & Clark, and then and there entered into
a verbal agreement with the said defendants and particularly
LeGrand P. Backman to appeal the aforesaid judgment xxx;
that plaintiffs informed the said defendant that they did
not have the cash to pay for attorney's fee on appeal and
asked defendant, LeGrand P. Backman if he would take the
matter on appeal for a percentage of the recovery, which
said defendant agreed to do, informing plaintiffs that the
usual fee was 1/3 of the recovery, but that he would not
charge plaintiffs that much, but would charge them a fair
fee, which plaintiffs agreed to pay and defendant, LeGrand
P. Backman agreed to receive for his services in making the
appeal for himself and for his said firm, the other defendants herein; that said defendant, LeGrand P. Backman informed the plaintiffs that they would have to pay approximately $100 for the cost of printing briefs on appeal, but
did not ask for said sum to be advanced then and there xxxx."
That allegation does not set forth a formal agreement,
it is nothing but a recital of a conversation which might have
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led to an agreement, the statement that appellants and respondents entered into an oral agreement is nothing but a
bare legal conclusion. The fact that appellants allege they
entered into an oral agreement does not make an agreement even in summary judgment proceedings.
It is evident that the parties, even if the allegations of
the complaint are accepted as true, were to form an agreement oral or written which was not done.
In 17 CJS-Contracts, Sec. 31, page 359 the following
statement of the law is found:
"In order that there may be an agreement, the parties
must have a distinct intention common to both and
without doubt or difference. Until all understand
alike there can be no assent and therefore no contract.
Both parties must assent to the same thing in the
same sense, and their minds must meet as to all
the terms."
It cannot be said in the instant case that the allegation
of the complaint shows that the minds of appellants and
respondents met as to all of the terms, the same thing in the
same sense is not shown to have been agreed upon and no
agreement is alleged which is not without doubt~ Not
even the amount which appellants allege they were to pay
was fixed with any certainty, they say it was approximately
$1100.00.
And in RCL on Contracts, Sec. 59, the law is stated:
"An agreement to be binding must be sufficiently
definite to enable the court to determine its exact
meaning and fix definitely the legal liability of
the parties."
In 92 ALR at page 1403 it is said:
"The courts have repeatedly held that it is an ele·
mental and fundamental rule of law that a contract
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to be valid 'must be certain and unequivocal in its
essential terms, either within itself or by reference to
some other agreement or matter' ".

If the decision of this court on this point stands, it would
mean that, thereby, the Trial Court would be required to
supply those terms of the agreement, in fact the very agreement which is not pleaded. The court should apply the
above rule of law, particularly in this case, inasmuch as
appellants would have the court impose a wholly oral contingent fee agreement not favored in the law, and which
does not recite essential parts. As was argued in our original
brief, the allegation as to an oral agreement even if pleaded
is entirely too indefinite and uncertain to constitute a contract as against a motion for summary judgment.
Cases of this nature, where a client engages and receives
the services of an attorney, oftimes without paying for them,
and then seeking damages in a lawsuit against him, for
alleged omissions or commissions, based on meager, flimsy
allegations of alleged oral negotiations, are outstanding
examples of the justice of the rule above stated; for members
of the Bar, by the very nature of their services, are likely
prey to such litigants, and too often are limited in their
defense to a mere verbal denial of the eager testimony of
sometimes avaricious plaintiffs.
Even if the allegation constituted an agreement made at
its inception, then the consideration passing from appellants
to respondents failed. Appellants contend that respondents
were to perform the agreement within a prescribed period of
time and that they failed to do so. Appellants presumably
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were to pay approximately $100 within the same period of
time, and this they failed to do. Appellants having failed to
perform, why then should respondents be required to perform? This Court has said there was no time within which
appellants were required to perform, but how does it appear
that respondents knew appellants were intending to perform
or would perform after the time within which respondents
were to perform had expired? The fact is without controversy that, at the expiration of the time within which re·
spondents were required to perform, appellants had failed
to perform their part of the agreement as alleged.
It should be borne in mind that the allegation of the
complaint does not state that resondents agreed to permit
appellants to pay the approximately $100 whenever they
saw fit, or at a time after the appeal period had expired,
but appellants simply allege that respondents did not ask
for said sum to be advanced then and there. Therefore, how
can this Court find and determine from that pleading that
appellants had a right to expect respondents to perform,
when appellants had not performed, and further say that
appellants could perform whenever they got good and ready
to do so, if ever. There was a total failure of consideration
and therefore no agreement.
This court reads into the agreement terms and conditions which are not there. In Bolen v. Parks, 308 P2d 521,
(Cal. App.) it was held:
"A court is not empowered to make for the parties to
a transaction an agreement, which they did not see
fit to make, and the function of the court is to ascer·
tain and declare the nature of the transaction actually
made."
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And in Young v. Border Broadcasting Co., (Ariz.) 255
P2d 888 the court said:
"The court cannot make a contract for the parties but
can only interpret them."
Even where the court has adopted the rule that all presumptions must be in favor of the party against whom a
summary judgment is entered, nevertheless the allegations of
the complaint must contain all of the essential ingredients
of a contract, and we respectfully submit that this complaint
falls short of that requirement. If the decision of this court
on this point stands, then this court will have read into the
complaint essential elements which are not contained
therein.
Point II
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND DETERMINING THAT RESPONDENTS DID NOT SHOW AS A
MATTER OF LAW THAT APPELLANTS COULD NOT
HAVE RECOVERED HAD AN APPEAL BEEN PERFECTED.
The decision of this court on this point, even under the
rule pertaining to summary judgments, in effect reverses the
long line of decisions handed down· by this court in which
the court has held that on appeal in a will contest, the Supreme Court, could not disturb findings of the trial court
if there was any competent evidence to support them.
See In re Hanson's Estate, Utah, 52 P2d 1103,
In re Swan's Estate, 51 Utah, 410, 170 P. 452,
In re LaMont's Estate, ((Utah), 79 P2d 652,
In re Don Ling Ring's Estate, 78 U 324, 2 P2d
902,
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Goldberg v. Green, 95 U 379, 81 P2d 1106, 177
ALR 1444,
In re Ford's Estate, 70 U 456, 261 P. 15,
In re Hansen's Will, 52 U 554, 177 P. 982,
In re Hanson's Will, 50 U 207, 167 P. 256,
In re Frandsen's Will, 50 U 156, 167 P. 362,
Miller v Livingstone, 31 U 415, 88 P. 338.
In the instant case the Trial Court, on the Motion for
Summary Judgment, had before it the entire record of the
Swan will case, which is all of the evidence that could have
been considered by it, as a matter of law, had the case been
before said court on the trial of the question of whether the
Supreme Court would have reversed the Trial Court, as to
Bridge, in the will case. Presumably that court fully considered that evidence, and decided that the Trial Court in
the will case made the correct decision in the will case as
to Bridge, just as it would have done if the question had been
before it on the trial, instead of on a motion for summary
judgment. There is no inherent evil in a summary judgment.
It is a proper proceeding, provided by the Rules of Practice.
In this case, it has the same effect as a judgment on the trial
would have, as to this particular issue. How, then, can this
court say that it must presume, because this is a motion for
summary judgment, that the Supreme Court would have
reversed the Trial Court as to Bridge, if an appeal had
been taken in the will case. We respectfully submit that
this is error.
In re Alexander's Estate, (Utah), 139 P2d 432 this
court said:
"A will contest is an 'action at law' in which Supreme
Court, on appeal, cannot weigh and pass on conflict-
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ing evidence, and can only determine whether there
is substantial competent evidence to support trial
court's findings and conclusions." The court cites
many of the above cases in support of this statement.
Now how does the court in a will case determine whether
there is substantial competent evidence? In re Hanson's
Estate supra the court said:
"In a case of this sort it is not usually possible to
procure direct evidence of the statements and conduct
which one accused of undue influence has used on the
decedent. The usual way is to give the surrounding
circumstances from which deductions may be made."
It must be presumed that the lower court in granting
respondents' motion for summary judgment considered the
whole record made in the court at the trial of the will case
and not only that part of the record contained in the briefs
filed herein.
The trial court had the right and obligation to consider
all of the evidence going to the health and general nervous
condition of Miss Swan, not only in determining testamentary
capacity but also to determine what sort of a subject the
parties had to work on, as was the rule laid down by this court
in re Hanson's Estate, supra in which the court said at page

1117, 52 P2d:
"In this case we have considerable doubt whether
Marie did not have sufficient mental capacity to make
a will. In some ways she appears to be quite intelligent. Because of her physical deformity and lack
of opportunity to live the life of a normal woman,
she was shy, suspicious, sensitive, irritable, self-conscious, retiring, and uninterested in what people who
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lead a normal life generally are. Coupled with these
characteristics was a weak body and impaired nervous system, resulting in emotional instability and
lack of control. Yet she longed for sympathy and to
express herself, which led her frequently to seek
company and conversation with others and to turn her
interests to childlike occupations as well as to those
things which gave her a refuge from herself and her
repressions. The benefit of this doubt which we entertain should he given to the findings of the trial
court in its conclusion that Marie was incompetent to
make a will.
While there may he some doubt as to whether the
decedent lacked testamentary capacity, there is no
doubt but that it was a mind easily capable of being
influenced. The evidence relating to Marie's mentality and general nervous control is therefore material and of aid not only in determining testamentary
capacity, but to determine what sort of subject Dr.
McDonald had to play upon. A strong mind is not
easily influenced. Therefore all the evidence of
mentality and its strength or weakness is material on
the issue of undue influence. The issue of undue influence involves two main lines of inquiry: ( 1) What
type of person is it claimed was influenced? and (2)
How or by what means was such person influenced?"
It is argued by appellants that this court having already
ruled that Miss Swan was not of unsound mind and that she
did not lack testamentary capacity, it is conclusive that
this court would have reversed the trial court in the original
case had an appeal been perfected, hut this is not so. The
trial court did determine, from all of the facts and evidence before it and from its having had the opportunity
to observe the witnesses and their demeanor on the witness
stand, that testatrix had a mind which could he and was
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influenced. The court made a finding as to same and
therefore this court has the duty to review the evidence in
the light most favorable to the findings. See Parrish v
Tahtaras, 7 Utah 2d 87, 318 P2d 642 also we refer to
Lawrence v Bamberger, 3 U 2d 247, 282 P2d 335 in which
the court said:
"Every reasonable intendment ought to be indulged
in favor of validity and correctness of judgment
under review, and it will not be disturbed unless
appellant meets his burden of affirmatively showing error."
See also Rummell v Bailey, 7 U2d 137, 320 P2d 653;
and Fleming v Fleming Felt Co., 7 U 2d 293, 323 P2d
712 wherein the court said:
"Where trial court found for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court on defendant's appeal reviewed the facts
disclosed by the record in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff."
See also Huber v Deep Creek lrr. Co. 6 U 2d 15, 305
1'2d 478, Saunders v Spina (Colorado) 344 P2d 469.
This court laid down a test as to mental capacity of a
testator in re: Hanson's Estate, 87 U 580, 52 P2d 1103 in
the following language:
"The true test is as to whether the testatrix had 'sufficient mind and memory (at the time of making the
will) to remember who were the natural objects of
her bounty, recall to mind her property, and dispose
of it understandingly according to some plan formed
in her mind'" citing Coleman v Marshall 263 Ill.
330, 104 NE 1042. (Italics supplied)
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It appears that the trial judge in the original will case
did this very thing. He applied the test and found that the
parties Wilda Gail Swan named to the doctors at the very
time she made the codicil here in question were not named,
and Ada Bridge, not having been mentioned to the doctors,
was named, therefore the trial court found that the test
'
as given by this court in the Hansen case was not met. Thus
the trial court placed the case squarely within that rule.
There is no conflict in the evidence nor is there any contradictory evidence as to this point. The finding of the court
is amply supported by the evidence and still this Honorable
Court now rules that the evidence before the trial court
on the motion for summary judgment was not sufficient for
the trial court to have granted respondent's motion.
It is recognized that the decision of this court in the
original appeal holding that Wilda Gail Swan did not lack
testamentary capacity to make a will cannot be reversed
in this case but we do contend most strenuously that the trial
court in the original case could have found from the evidence
and made its Conclusions of Law and judgment based on such
finding that because of the mind of the subject which the
parties had to work on Gail Swan could have been and was
infl ue'nced in the making of the codicil under which Ada
Bridge, whom Gail Swan did not mention to the doctors, was
named as a beneficiary and that the codicil was not that of
Gail Swan and did not carry out her desires. Such findings
need not be supported by evidence that the testatrix was
incompetent to make a will. Re Hanson's Estate supra.
But such condition of mind may he considered when tht.
question of influence exists. Under the cases hereinabove
set out it may he presumed that the lower court in granting
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respondent's motion for summary judgment concluded that
there was sufficient evidence for the trial court in the will
contest case to have made such finding.
There was competent evidence to support the conclusions of the trial court and if this court is not persuaded
that the conclusions are supported by direct evidence it is
clearly evident then that the evidence is derived from "sense"
facts as this court found and determined in the Hanson
Estate case where the court said:
"There cannot be any objection to conclusions of fact
in findings if there is any competent evidence to support the conclusions. It is the business of the trial
court to conclude from the basic competent testimony,
certain facts, which would therefore necessarily be
conclusions. They would in many cases, being
ultimate or subultimate facts, necessarily be conclu·
sions or inferences derived from what may be called
'sense' facts; that is, facts derived from the testimony
of witnesses based on the observations or use of the
senses of such witnesses."
We are mindful of the fact that the court in making the
statement hereinabove quoted had under consideration the
question of conclusions of a witness, still we say the law as
therein given is applicable in the instant case. Especially
is this true in the further statement by the court in the
Hansen Estate case found on page 1108, 52 P2d as follows:
"When the observation of the witness is over a long
period of time, and the acts, conduct, or sayings of
the person observed are many and perhaps trivial
and of such a nature as to impress the mind of the
observer with their continued insanity, but not suf-
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ficiently distinctive to impress the observer's mind
with exactness or even with their content or meaning
because of their general irrelevancy or incoherence,
certain conclusions, if not too broad, would be permissible."
It would be most difficult we think, to find two cases
fitting the same pattern as closely as does the case of Hansen
Estate and the Swan case. It does appear that this Honorable Court by its ruling here entirely disregards the rule
of law given in the Hanson Estate case which rule appears
to be that adopted by the courts of a majority of states, but
on the contrary this decision in effect requires positive and
direct evidence to be given in order to support the finding
and conclusions of the trial court. We are not unmindful
of the fact that the rule in most cases on motions for summary judgment requires that all presumptions are to be
resolved in favor of the party against whom the motion is
made, but we think the rule was not intended to be so broad
as to carry such presumptions against the rule of law laid
down by this court in Lawrence v Bamberger, supra. Espe·
cially is this so when a full dress trial can add nothing to the
record already made, which record was before the court at
the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. It seems
that the purpose of summary judgment proceedings would be
defeated if this were not the rule.
In conclusion, we cannot believe that this court intended,
by its determination of question number ( 3) of its decision
herein, to predetermine the question therein set forth, and
thereby virtually to preclude the Trial Court in this case from
trying the issue of law as to whether, had the appeal been
perfected in behalf of Ada Bridge, this court would have
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found the bequest to Bridge void. However, unless this
Honorable Court grants this Motion for Rehearing and
reverses or modifies its decision in this regard, in our
humble opinion the court below, out of the profound respect
which it has and should have for this court's decisions, wil1
likely construe the decision of this court as having predetermined this question of law; leaving as the only issue to be
determined by the Trial Court the existence of a contract and
the alleged negligence of the defendants. This would constitute grievous error.
Respectfully submitted,

ROMNEY & NELSON
Attorneys for Respondents
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